"Mental unsoundness in a person accused of crime may give rise to two entirely distinct legal problems. The first is the question of the defendant's responsibility; whether at the time of the act charged, he was so mentally disordered as not to be punishable for it, under the legal test of responsibility; that is, whether at that time he knew the wrongfulness of the act, and, in some states, whether he was able to resist the impulse to commit it. . . . The other involves the defendant's mental condition not at the time of the act charged, but at the time of the criminal proceedings-whether he is presently sane enough to plead or be tried, or after trial, whether he is sane enough to undergo punishment. Since the first problem involves the 'guilt' or 'innocence' of the defendant, while the second does not, the latter has been given comparatively little consideration. Nevertheless, as a matter of procedure, it is highly important. Any reform in the method of trying persons alleged to be insane probably will come through perfecting means for preventing the trial of mentally diseased or deficient persons, ratber than through a change in the substantive law or procedure relating to the question of responsibility."" Introduction Psychiatry may be said to have two major functions in regard to the law, a) to advise whether or not a person is able to undergo this or that procedure which his case seems to warrant, e.g. to undergo trial, to undergo sentencing and so on; or b) to advise whether or not his behaviour is so determined by illness that, no matter what the facts of the case may be, he cannot be said to have acted with the ordinary responsibility of an adult. There are certainly several other ways in which a psychiatrist may insert himself into the judicial process, but these are traditional, and undoubtedly the most important. What I would like to discuss, using as a basis various studies carried out at the Law-Medicine Institute, and others, Dennis & Co. Buffalo, N.Y. (1954); p. 428. are certain relatively neglected aspects of these problems. I will maintain, and possibly demonstrate, that competency is at least as important as responsibility to the psychiatrist, that competency studies are by no means as adequate as we could wish, that competency offers psychiatry a considerably greater usefulness to the law than other legal concepts, and that its potential value to psychiatry itself may be even greater. The specific importance lies in the increasing reorienting of our thinking to certain ego-operations, namely, the problems of mastering the environment, which historically have been somewhat neglected until relatively recently.
Though Weihofen, in the above quotation, points very accurately to a proper function of a psychiatrist, namely, to deal in a sophisticated manner with a person's fitness for trial, I will raise the point that preventing trial is by no means the only outcome of this desirable sophistication. Permitting a person to square his accounts speedily with society is at least as important. Experience shows, I believe, that psychiatric treatment, when indicated, is best carried out when the real-life issues of prison or freedom are at least potentially settled, and when the psychiatrist can meaningfully plan, in a legal and ethical manner, in his patients' best interest.
I. The Background
The average psychiatrist, when he is forced to pay some attention to the demands of the law, seems irresistibly attracted to the concept of responsibility. This is certainly an interesting area of great sweep and philosophic importance, that justifies the attention of so eminent a group. Unfortunately, there is little evidence that psychiatrists' contributions to this point, at least so far, are of any great moment. Though validly operational, psychiatric procedures may some day be designed in this area, 'responsibility' is still not a psychiatrically defined concept. In philosophy, theology and morality, doubtless there are definitive operational procedures of great power concerning responsibility, but these are disciplines in which the usual psychiatrist is untrained. Competency, or capacity, is a legal concept which seems eminently suited for translation into the diagnostic and prognostic skills of our profession, and indeed we perform what are actually competency evaluations very often. That we do so quite often is indicated by figures from Massachusetts, where generally cases in which the courts have more or less initiated commitments are about 15 per cent or more of the admissions to state hospitals. Competency is, in the law, a highly operational concept already, tied closely to our supposed interest in behaviours. And yet the amount of psychiatric writing in this area, compared to the embattled tracts on responsibility, are neither very extensive nor very pertinent.
Moreover, recent studies of the actual disposition of court-referred cases (4), appear to show that psychiatric institutions have some interesting biases and blind spots when they serve as agents of the courts (1) . They blend into an indecipherable porridge, four quite disparate entities:
Competent or not competent Psychotic or not psychotic Responsible or not responsible Committable or not committable If a court, having attended one of our burgeoning seminars for the laity, and having been filled with the proper religious awe, is rash enough to send a puzzling case to a psychiatric hospital, he may have in mind nothing more complex than an opinion as to the patient's fitness to stand trial. This procedure, after all, is our greatest and most hard won of civil liberties and judges tend to value it highly. If, as usually happens, he receives back a word that the patient is (a) committable or not; or (b) psychotic or not, he is usually too polite to point out that this is a non sequitur, and usually too busy to pursue the question of the rights of the patient in the matter. This nonanswer is explicable enough. Examination of the records, and observation of psychiatrists at work indicate that they honestly believe that a medical diagnosis subsumes the other possibilities mentioned (1,7). What can happen when the courts too easily accept this non-response as a real answer was shown by one of our studies: When we discovered an appalling number of quite pleasant, very old gentlemen still awaiting trial, after many years, in a state hospital prison. One of them, originally arrested for vagrancy, had been waiting since 1896. When presented with data of this kind, psychiatrists may be annoyed, and may point out that obviously the old gentlemen must have been psychotic and committable. If pushed, they may indicate that it was obviously better for such people to be in a hospital, where they could be treated, than in a jail. It would certainly be rash and possibly illogical, to point out that very few jurisdictions give 70 year sentences for vagrancy. Now, psychiatrists may well feel that I am unfair. This institution, in which the old gentlemen still reside, a curious halfhospital, half-prison, is no worse than many state hospitals. And state hospitals, until very recently, were places to store people, not treat them, since it is administratively much neater with a small staff, to run a warehouse than a hospital. We cannot blame the legal psychiatrist for conditions that have affected, and still affect, psychiatry as a whole. But, these general factors are not the only ones operating. I think that there are at least two other factors which might tend to make legal psychiatrists less effective than they might be, independent of our purely institutional deficits. These are:
Psychiatry tends to operate within one or another set of psychiatric systems, which means their diagnosis and prognosis depend rather less than psychiatrists realize upon a patient's functioning in the real world and rather more upon deductions made within a logically closed system. I refer, of course, to our more or less Kraepelian systems of classification and our more or less Freudian systems of dynamics. Clinical practice tends to be that psychiatrists attempt to place a patient logically within a system rather than to place him as a potential actor in the outside world. As a consequence, psychiatrists are considerably more comfortable in giving long range predictions of what a given character structure is apt to do (for which, life and memory being short, they cannot usually be held to . account); or estimates of what must haue happened in childhood to have formed such a character (a procedure in which the replicative rigour could be considered weak), than they are in giving estimates of what their patients are apt to do in a given situation next week. Despite this, I have seen some breath-takingly accurate short-term predictions given by experienced and gifted psychiatrists. Unfortunately, I have never found out how this is done, and my knowledge of the unconscious leads me to suspect the explanations given by those able to do it. I remember a psychiatrist who impressed his colleagues by his ability, in a research task, to predict which children of a group would be arrested for a crime. His own explanation for this ability was rich, subtle, complex, a model of applied ego-psychology. Unfortunately, his team was unwise enough to have employed a statistician. This serpent demonstrated, at least to his own low satisfaction, that our prognosticator could predict arrest only for that population where the history revealed that the juvenile had been arrested before. So, you see how our modern sophistication can confirm, albeit a little over-elaborately, certain facts of recidivism that we have known since the mid-Nineteenth Century.
Psychiatrists tend to see themselves as another channel of disposition, parallel to the courts (and indeed, to any other executive agency of society) (7). Though the father of us all, Sigmund Freud, was basically an austere and classic pessimist, his American descendants, at least, are imbued with an incurable romanticism. The documentation of this would be out of place here, but to a surprising extent, some psychiatrists feel that their handling of a patient must be ipso facto, 'better' (even if it leads to 70 years in jail) than the court's handling of the same individual. That psychiatric institutions are as yet not administratively geared to conduct adequate competency examinations is seen, too often, as society's fault, rather than due to our own lack of imagination in developing adequate procedures.
While man-power shortages etc., are important, it is at least as likely that equally important reasons for our own incompetency in judging competency are, in summary, the belief that our way is better, our difficulty in understanding exactly what it is the court requires and our slowness in devising adequate prognostic methods suitable for a court; this last being due, at least in part, to our difficulty in extricating ourselves from our professional theories.
II. The Problem of Competency Determination
What I would like to look at, admittedly in a very preliminary fashion, is how some of these considerations affect the problem of competency determination by psychiatrists. There are, of course, many 'competencies,' legally, and admirable reviews of large areas of the subject exist by Weihofen (11) and the Michigan group (2). The specific competency to be examined is capacity to stand trial in criminal offences (4). This is somewhat unique in legal matters in that much the same test applies in most English-speaking jurisdictions (6), and for this reason alone would seem worth translating into psychiatric criteria. The generally agreed on pragmatic test for 'present competency' provides that a per- Vol. 9, NO.6 son is competent if he can provide as much assistance as is necessary to develop the 'true facts' of the case; if he can, in other words, choose and assist counsel, act as witness on his own behalf and confront other witnesses. In other words, if he "is capable of understanding the nature and object of the proceedings going against him, if he rightly comprehends his own condition with reference to such proceedings and can conduct his defence in a rational manner ... although on some other subject his mind may be deranged or unsound". (6) Let me illustrate the problem posed by the above with a case. M, a 52 year-old man who is diagnosed as paranoid schizophrenic, has been hospitalized most of his adult life. He is a pleasant companion, is adept at tools, keeps automobiles generally in adequate condition and can grow vegetables with enviable skill. As my houseman for a good many years, he is a valuable member of the family. However, he believes that a number of prominent women are in love with him. He writes them letters which, if this belief were true, would be acceptable, provided they had an earthy sense of humour. Since they neither love him nor, apparently, have much of a sense of humour, he is periodically investigated by the Post Office or called to account by hospital authorities. When taxed with his delinquency, he shows a characteristic excited, ideationally confused syndrome, with :florid projective ideas, which lasts several days. When, however, someone walks off with one of his tools, or I neglect to order paint or some similar event occurs in the 'real' world, he is precise and pointedly realistic in his behaviour, no more eccentric and no less realistic than many rural New Englanders. I would have little hesitation via a casual conversation, in relying upon M and I arriving at the 'facts of the case' in the matter of a missing lawn-mower. If Miss Taylor were to visit our institution, I would take with a grain of salt M's explanation of her motives.
Here are implicit several of the factors relevant to competency. M would function very adequately with myself, an old friend and employer, but would he with the courts? He would probably do well if it were an issue, no matter how important per se, which did not involve his particular problem. I am not concerned that M obviously has major problems of a latent homosexual nature, that he has shown marked paranoid ideation, that his pre-phallic sadistic impulses are held in check by exceedingly jerry-built defences, that his prognosis for becoming a training analyst is very poor. I am only concerned with whether he can, in such and such a situation, for a given period of time, exercise his rights as a citizen. I am not even concerned with whether he should be sentenced or treated. T'bat is another issue also relating to legal competency, but a different competency, the capacity to undergo sentence, with quite a different potential set of prognostics.
III. Remedies
In the general operations of science, it is considered unwise, at least initially, to make too high-order a generalization from your data. The higher stature of North Europeans may have many explanations other than the one that seemed so obvious in the Nineteenth Century: that towering height was merely another attribute of the H errenmensch. After the Yalu and Singapore, we are less narcissistic, and are ready enough to look at other explanations, such as alimentation or genetic drift. Extrapolation from data is hazardous, in other words, and there is no substitute for data specifically gathered for a specific purpose. 'Superiority' of North Europeans, to a scientist, means "superior in what way, to whom, in what circumstances?" 'Competency' means, similarly, "competent for what in what circumstances." As psychiatrists, we could assume that certain variables and factors would be obviously pertinent.
For example, what is the symbolic meaning of a trial, or testifying, to this particular individual? Or, again, what is the general nature of this individual's patterns of reaction to stress? It is not enough to call him psychotic, for many psychotics would do much better at a trial, in all probability, than most hysterics. Some regressed psychotics, and some inadequate personalities, not usually considered psychotic, have over-all patterns of dealing with reality, by more or less massive uninvolvement, and would be a good deal less competent than many paranoids in any situation of rapid change. When we look at less global areas, we might ask ourselves certain more sophisticated questions. A trial is a kaleidoscope of activity to the non-initiate, and we might enquire, if we knew how, about the capacity of the patient for social learning. We might ask ourselves what social class the patient came from, and whether he sees the court as a supporter of his just cause (as middle-class people often do); or as the inevitable punishing parent, as lower-class individuals seem to do rather often. We must ask ourselves, when we attempt to elicit the latter fantasy, whether this is dealt with merely with resentment or with unconscious relief, for much will depend on whether the trial process is seen masochistically or not.
But our efforts will be nugatory if we know little about the process for which we are estimating his fitness. If our experience at trials is limited to the abrasive experience of testifying, or the stealthy filing of opinions as amici curiae or the presiding over the mock trial that takes place at psychiatric rounds in a hospital, we may act with less than full efficiency, since there is no substitute for knowledge of what is really going on. We may justify the observation that a competency procedure is an affair in which we apply a rule we do not quite understand to a patient we scarcely know in order to determine his fitness for an environment we have never seen.
There are administrative solutions, painful but possible, to the first and third items mentioned just above. We can improve our skills in translating terms such as competency, responsibility and so on by adding a lawyer to our group of available consultants. Better still, perhaps, is the technique of adding a lawyer to a competency team of psychiatrist, psychologist, and social worker, as we are planning experimentally to do at Boston University. He would also be of very great use in teaching us the environment of the trial. Even better, we feel, is to have such a competency team function in a court setting, which our court clinic system in Massachusetts permits. Our clinic system does estimate competency (in a good court clinic, a psychiatrist might have time to see about a third of the cases where a judge raises an issue of competency) but this is not his major function, which is to be a therapeutic arm of the Probation Office. This administrative arrangement, which works superbly in treatment, for obvious reasons, still has a tendency to keep the court clinician at some distance from diagnostic problems, as mentioned. It is interesting, however, that even a solitary psychiatrist, working in competency as a kind of sideline, is able to decrease the number of cases sent to a state hospital by 30% (5). What such a clinician could do if he had his own' beds in a psychiatric hospital and his own diagnostic team, which could function both in court and hospital as a unit, raises fascinating possibilities. In a few years, we may be able to report on such an administrative system in operation within Boston University. The potential utility of a system in which legal, psychiatric and probation skills are artfully integrated are, of course, apparent.
What may not be so apparent is the difficulties that still remain once the administrative problems are on their way to solution. The psychiatric skills which are pertinent to legal (and other social) needs are. just not as highly developed as we need. Rapaport (9) made a perceptive comment on a recent paper by White (12) which bears noticing. White was attacking from the developmental point of view, the problem I am here concerned with, the idea of social competency generally, (which has also been ably reviewed by Phillips [8]). Rapaport, commenting on what he felt to be a confusion in White's paper, pointed out that there are three epigenetic theories, actual or potential, within psychoanalysis. The psychosexual theory of Freud, the psy-chosocial theory of Erikson (4) and potentially the competence epigenesis that White was discussing. I do not want to lose myself in a Talmudic exegeses concerning whether White's ideas can be subsumed under one or another of the earlier theoretical systems, as Rapaport apparently believes. I would like to draw attention to this interesting and probably fruitful development in theory. Psychoanalysis has taught us, I believe, a good deal about how certain abnormal states, especially sexual misbehaviours, are learned; it has helped us rather less in helping us to deal with them therapeutically; and it has probably helped us least of all in determining how a given person, with or without gross pathology, is apt to believe in a given situation. That experienced psychiatrists can often do this is of no great help in the general problems of treatment and diagnosis. The procedures hidden within the term 'experience' are little known, but were tbey known, could be communicated. It seems odd that so much of our daily work should be on such a relatively subjective basis, where we employ no clearly perceived operations and no empirically derived theories. Competency in dealing with the world, coping mechanisms, mastery techniques, whatever name you care to call them, are certainly linked with psychosocial and psychosexual processes, but both logically and often in practice, they may be quite distinct. Very creative and productive people are often crippled in the satisfactions to be drawn from both empathy and sensuality; and conversely, there are always the annoyingly omnicompetent in all three spheres. A great deal of the difficulties that people get into are because of deficiencies in the psychosocial (in Erikson's meaning) or psychosexual spheres, but the processes to which the law then subjects them, too often tap still another area, that of social mastery or competence or coping, or whatever you wish to call it. Argument from one area to the other is dangerous, and one cannot adequately estimate any area unless his tools are specifically for that area.
Psychiatry needs, if it is not to become merely an ancillary arm of psychologists, to develop diagnostic skills in the last area as well as the other two. Perhaps, techniques developed by learning theorists may be useful but this would lead us beyond the bounds of our paper (10).
Conclusions
It is felt that competency determinations offer a good deal of scope for legal psychiatry. They are operational, potentially explicable in psychiatric terms which might also be meaningful to the law, do not (at least as far as competency to stand trial is concerned) vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and may even add to psychiatric knowledge.
Certain difficulties occur in this area, however. The psychiatrist does not always understand the needs of the law and tends to confuse competency with functionally allied but logically distinct concepts, e.g. committability, responsibility, etc. Generally, he feels that these other problems are subsumed under a medical diagnosis, which, being given, automatically solves all of the other problems. This is true neither clinically nor legally, in most cases. He usually avoids giving specific prognostic data, even when he understands the legal problem involved, since his psychiatric system of thought, his general ethic toward his patient, etc. are all oriented toward diagnostic and therapeutic classifications, and not to prognostic classifications, despite great individual skill often seen in this area.
Solutions to the problems of ignorance are complex but feasible. The psychiatrist and the lawyer can join a team, and there must be greater liaison between court and hospital. The difficulties in the area of psychiatric orientation are greater; more studies must be done in the general field of estimating coping ability and more thought must be given to a mean-
